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inmate on their own behalf and on behalf of others 
similarly situated 
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ARTHUR T. PRASSE, Commissioner, Bureau of 
Corrections of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; 
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Graterford; CHARLES S. FRISBEE, School Director State 
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor in D.C. 
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       Michael R. Stiles 
        United States Attorney 
       Barbara L. Herwig 
       Robert M. Loeb (argued) 
       United States Department of Justice 
       Patrick Henry Building 
       601 D Street, N.W. 
       Washington, D.C. 20530 
 
        Attorneys for Intervenor/Appellee 
       United States of America 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Plaintiffs appeal the District Court's decision to terminate 
jurisdiction over a consent decree pursuant to the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act. We affirm. 
 
I. 
 
A. The Consent Decree 
 
In 1970, inmates at Pennsylvania's seven state prisons 
("the Inmates") brought a class action lawsuit against 
various state officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983. The 
Inmates alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement. 
In 1978, the District Court approved a consent decree 
settling most of the issues raised in the lawsuit. The 
District Court retained jurisdiction, and subsequently 
approved several amendments to the decree. 
 
As amended, the decree governs nearly every aspect of 
prison management. Among other things, the decree (1) 
specifies the type of misconduct for which prisoners can be 
punished; (2) limits the punishment that can be imposed 
for specific acts of misconduct; (3) restricts prison officials' 
handling of prisoner mail; (4) guarantees prisoner access to 
outside publications; (5) establishes health care and 
sanitation standards;1 (6) imposes restrictive standards for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. One provision provides that "[a]t each institution a physician will 
conduct a monthly inspection of all food preparation and food storage 
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prison officials' use of force,2 restraints, and mace;3 (7) 
prescribes detailed procedures for conducting cell searches;4 
(8) gives prisoners the right to possess civilian clothing; and 
(9) requires the prisons to provide free postage to prisoners. 
The Defendants contend that the decree has imposed 
substantial administrative burdens on the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections, and that as a result of the 
decree prison officials have faced burdensome legal battles, 
having to defend many of their day-to-day management 
decisions in federal court. 
 
B. The Termination Provision 
 
Responding to concerns that similar consent decrees 
were crippling prison systems throughout the country, 
Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in 
1996. One provision of the PLRA authorizes defendants in 
prison condition lawsuits to obtain 
 
       immediate termination of any prospective relief if the 
       relief was approved or granted in the absence of a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
space, the institution hospital and infirmary, and all other facilities 
connected with health care and health care delivery." Joint App. at 253. 
That physician must "submit a report of his inspection to his 
superintendent immediately after his inspection, and these reports shall 
be maintained at each institution." Id. 
 
2. The provisions governing the use of force authorize force only where 
necessary to prevent harm to person or property or to thwart an escape 
attempt. Joint App. at 256. In contrast, Pennsylvania law provides that 
prison officials may use physical force to compel compliance with prison 
rules. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. S 509(5). 
 
3. Prison officials must consult medical personnel before using mace on 
any prisoner "to determine whether that resident has any disease or 
condition that would make the use of Mace particularly dangerous." 
Joint App. at 261. Once authorized to do so, prison officials may only 
use mace "in a short burst of approximately two (2) seconds in 
duration," and are required to wait fifteen seconds before firing a second 
burst. 
 
4. Prison officials must give inmates notice before conducting cell 
searches, and allow them to be present during any such searches. 
Inmates subjected to cell searches must "be asked to sign a record to 
show that he was present during the search or . . . that he [chose] not 
to be present." Joint App. at 285. 
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       finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, 
       extends no further than necessary to correct the 
       violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive 
       means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal 
       right. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 3626(b)(2) ("the termination provision"). The 
supervising court may refuse to terminate jurisdiction only 
if it makes written findings "that prospective relief remains 
necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the 
Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct 
the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective 
relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to 
correct the violation." Id. S 3626(b)(3). 
 
C. The Termination Order 
 
Relying on S 3626(b)(2), Defendants filed a motion to 
terminate the 1978 consent decree on September 23, 1997. 
The Inmates argued that the motion was inappropriate and 
asked the court to hold Defendants in contempt. The 
Inmates also maintained that the PLRA's termination 
provision was unconstitutional. 
 
The United States filed a motion to intervene pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 2403, seeking the opportunity to defend the 
constitutionality of the PLRA's termination provision. The 
District Court granted that motion. 
 
The District Court subsequently issued an opinion and 
order granting the Defendants' motion to terminate the 
consent decree, and denying the Inmates' motion that the 
Defendants be held in contempt. Imprisoned Citizens Union 
v. Shapp, 11 F.Supp.2d 586 (E.D.Pa. 1998). The Inmates 
promptly filed a motion for reconsideration. The District 
Court denied that motion. The Inmates then filed the 
present appeal. 
 
II. 
 
Appellants raise four issues on appeal: (1) whether the 
PLRA's termination provision violates the constitutional 
separation-of-powers doctrine, as applied to consent 
decrees entered before the PLRA's enactment; (2) whether 
the termination provision violates the equal protection 
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guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) 
whether the District Court abused its discretion by refusing 
to stay Defendants' motion to terminate; and (4) whether 
the District Court abused its discretion by refusing to hold 
Defendants in contempt of court.5 We will address each 
issue in turn. 
 
A. Separation-of-Powers 
 
The Inmates argue that the PLRA's termination provision 
violates the separation-of-powers doctrine in three respects. 
First, they argue that the provision requires courts to 
reopen final judgments in violation of the well-established 
rule that Congress may not interfere with the final 
judgments of Article III courts. See Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995). Second, they claim 
that the termination provision "mandate[s] the result in a 
particular case." United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
128, 146- 47 (1871). Third, they maintain that the 
provision strips the courts of their inherent power to 
enforce effective remedies in constitutional cases. 
 
We note at the outset that six other circuits have upheld 
the PLRA against a separation-of-powers challenge. See 
Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 943-45 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied 118 S.Ct. 2368 (1998); Dougan v. Singletary, 129 
F.3d 1424, 1426-27 (11th Cir. 1997); Inmates of Suffolk 
County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 656-57 (1st Cir. 1997); 
Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 173 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1087 (8th Cir. 1997) 
reh'g granted (Dec. 23, 1997); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 
365, 371 (4th Cir. 1996). Only the Ninth Circuit has 
concluded otherwise. Taylor v. United States, 143 F.3d 
1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998) reh'g granted (Nov. 3, 1998). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. At oral argument, the Inmates also argued that the PLRA is 
unconstitutional because it provides plaintiffs a mere 30 days in which 
to gather evidence necessary to oppose termination under 18 U.S.C. 
S 3626(b)(3). See Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 1998). 
However, because the Inmates neither raised this argument before the 
District Court nor discussed it in their briefs on appeal, we do not 
address it. 
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1. Reopening a Final Judgment 
 
The Inmates contend that S 3626(b)(2) impermissibly 
reopens a final judgment. Relying on the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 
(1995), they argue that the provision violates the 
separation-of-powers doctrine by allowing Congress to "set 
aside . . . final judgment[s]." Id. at 240. 
 
In Plaut, the Court declared unconstitutional a federal 
statute that required courts to reopen certain securities 
fraud cases that had been dismissed on statute-of- 
limitations grounds. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 214-15. The Court 
concluded that the statute violated the separation-of- 
powers doctrine by interfering with the "judicial Power . . . 
to render dispositive judgments." Id. at 219. The Court 
explained that the separation-of-powers doctrine generally 
forbids Congress from reversing final judgments in a suit 
for money damages. Id. At the same time, however, the 
Court noted that this rule does not apply to legislation that 
merely "alter[s] the prospective effect of injunctions entered 
by Article III courts." Id. at 232. 
 
This exception for legislation that alters the prospective 
effects of injunctions is not new: "its roots burrow deep into 
our constitutional soil." Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. 
Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 656 (1st Cir. 1997). It can be traced 
to Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 
(18 How.) 421 (1855), where the Supreme Court held that 
Congress has the power to alter prospective judgments in 
equity. 
 
Wheeling Bridge arose out of an earlier case in which the 
Supreme Court found that a particular bridge unreasonably 
interfered with navigable waters, and ordered that the 
bridge be removed or elevated. See 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 
626. After the first decision, Congress passed a statute 
declaring the bridge to be a lawful structure, establishing it 
as a post road, and requiring vessels using the river to 
avoid interfering with the bridge. The parties subsequently 
returned to the Court when the bridge company sought to 
rebuild the bridge after a storm had destroyed the original 
structure. Recognizing the impact of the intervening 
congressional action, the Court dissolved its injunction. 
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In rejecting the plaintiff's argument that Congress' action 
was an unconstitutional attempt to override the Court's 
earlier decision, the Court explained that while Congress 
cannot alter a judgment at law, it can alter the prospective 
elements of a judgment in equity by changing the 
underlying rule of law. Id. at 431-32. The Court reasoned 
that 
 
       if the remedy in this case had been an action at law, 
       and a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff were 
       for damages, the right to these would have passed 
       beyond the reach of the power of congress. It would 
       have depended, not upon the public right of the free 
       navigation of the river, but upon the judgment of the 
       court. The decree before us, so far as it respect[s] the 
       costs adjudged, stands upon the same principles, and 
       is unaffected by the subsequent law. But that part of 
       the decree, directing the abatement of the obstruction, 
       is executory, a continuing decree, which requires not 
       only the removal of the bridge, but enjoins defendants 
       against any reconstruction or continuance. Now, 
       whether it is a future existing or continuing 
       obstruction depends upon the question whether or not 
       it interferes with the right of navigation. If, in the mean 
       time, since the decree, this right has been modified by 
       the competent authority, so that the bridge is no longer 
       an unlawful obstruction, it is quite plain the decree of 
       the court cannot be enforced. 
 
Id. at 431-32. Wheeling Bridge therefore stands for the 
proposition that when Congress changes the law underlying 
a judgment awarding prospective injunctive relief, the 
judgment becomes void to the extent that it is inconsistent 
with the amended law. 
 
The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the 
validity of this principle, and has even recognized its 
application to consent decrees. For example, in Rufo v. 
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992), the 
Court explained that a consent decree may be modified 
when "one or more of the obligations placed upon the 
parties has become impermissible under federal law" or 
when "the statutory or decisional law has changed to make 
legal what the decree was designed to prevent." Id. at 388. 
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Similarly, in System Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 
(1961), the Court noted that 
 
       the District Court's authority to adopt a consent decree 
       comes only from the statute which the decree is 
       intended to enforce. Frequently of course the terms 
       arrived at by the parties are accepted without change 
       by the adopting court. But just as the adopting court 
       is free to reject agreed-upon terms as not in 
       furtherance of statutory objectives, so must it be free to 
       modify the terms of a consent decree when a change in 
       law brings those terms in conflict with statutory 
       objectives. . . . The parties have no power to require of 
       the court continuing enforcement of rights the statute 
       no longer gives. 
 
Id. at 651-52. 
 
Thus, unlike the judgments at issue in Plaut, the consent 
decree here is not impervious to legislative modification. As 
a judgment awarding prospective injunctive relief--much 
like the judgment at issue in Wheeling Bridge--the Inmates' 
consent decree is necessarily altered every time "a change 
in law brings [the decree's] terms in conflict with statutory 
objectives." System Fed'n No. 91, 364 U.S. at 651. 
 
Such a change has occurred here. In enacting the PLRA, 
Congress exercised its Article I authority to prescribe rules 
for courts to apply when issuing or perpetuating 
prospective relief. Those rules do not transgress the 
separation-of-powers doctrine. If anything, a judicial 
determination that Congress lacked authority to limit the 
prospective application of injunctive orders would present a 
more serious separation-of-powers problem. As the First 
Circuit recently stated, 
 
       If forward-looking judgments in equity were inviolate, 
       then one of two scenarios would develop: either the 
       legislature would be stripped of the ability to change 
       substantive law once an injunction had been issued 
       pursuant to that law, or an issued injunction would 
       continue to have force after the law that originally gave 
       the injunction legitimacy had been found wanting (and 
       hence, altered). The first of these possible results 
       would work an undue judicial interference with the 
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       legislative process, while the second would create an 
       intolerable tangle in which some laws applied to some 
       persons and not to others. Since the separation of 
       powers principle is a two-way street, courts must be 
       careful not to embrace a legal regime that promotes 
       such awkward scenarios. 
 
Inmates of Suffulk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 656- 
57 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 
A determination that Congress is powerless to alter the 
courts' authority to award prospective injunctive relief 
would be especially unwarranted here, since the Supreme 
Court has commented on the importance of getting the 
courts out of the prison management business: 
 
       [C]ourts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly 
       urgent problems of prison management. . . . [T]he 
       problems of prisons in America are complex and 
       intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily 
       susceptible of resolution by decree. Running a prison is 
       an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires 
       expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, 
       all of which are peculiarly within the province of the 
       legislative and executive branches of government. 
       Prison administration is, moreover, a task that has 
       been committed to the responsibility of those branches, 
       and separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of 
       judicial restraint. Where a state penal system is 
       involved, federal courts have . . . additional reason to 
       accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities. 
 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, our decision 
today is not merely consistent with separation-of-powers 
principles; it furthers those principles. 
 
Nevertheless, the Inmates maintain that the Wheeling 
Bridge exception does not apply here because the law 
underlying the consent decree--which they claim to be the 
Eighth Amendment--was not amended by the PLRA. In 
raising this argument, they rely heavily on the Ninth 
Circuit's opinion in Taylor v. United States, 143 F.3d 1178 
(9th Cir. 1998), reh'g granted (Nov. 3, 1998). The Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that "[e]ven though the district court here 
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. . . was never called upon to decide the factual and legal 
issues underlying the [inmates'] constitutional claims, it is 
clear that such claims were resolved by the consent decree, 
and the Constitution remains the law underpinning the 
dispute." Applying this reasoning, the Taylor panel 
concluded that the PLRA "clearly did not""change[ ] the 
substantive law upon which the parties' consent decree . . . 
was based." Id. at 1183. 
 
We disagree with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, and we 
reject the Inmates' argument. The law underlying the 
consent decree is not the Eighth Amendment; it is the 
courts' statutory authority to issue prospective injunctive 
relief in the absence of an ongoing violation of a federal 
right. This authority existed when the consent decree was 
entered, but was withdrawn with the enactment of the 
PLRA. Accord, Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 
F.3d 649, 657 (1st Cir. 1997) ("The relevant underlying law 
in this case is not the Eighth Amendment, as there has 
been no finding of an ongoing constitutional violation."); 
Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 372 (4th Cir. 1996) ("The 
Inmates fail to understand that the applicable law is not 
the Eighth Amendment, but rather is the authority of the 
district court to award relief greater than that required by 
federal law."). 
 
This would be a very different case if we were convinced-- 
as the Taylor panel obviously was--that the PLRA 
categorically terminates all relief available to "prisoners who 
claim constitutional violations." Taylor, 143 F.3d at 1183. 
But the PLRA expressly preserves the courts' authority to 
remedy violations of prisoners' federal rights. See 18 U.S.C. 
S 3626(b)(3); see also infra, Section II.A.3. The Inmates 
therefore cannot maintain that the PLRA curtailed their 
Eighth Amendment rights. Accordingly, we reject the 
argument that the PLRA goes beyond amending the law 
underlying the consent decree. 
 
The Inmates also contend that the Wheeling Bridge 
exception applies only in cases involving "public" rights. 
They claim that because the consent decree was intended 
to protect the "private" rights of individual prisoners, 
Congress is powerless to amend it. This argument appears 
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to be based on the following language from Wheeling 
Bridge: 
 
        [I]t is urged, that the act of congress cannot have the 
       effect and operation to annul the judgment of the court 
       already rendered, or the rights determined thereby in 
       favor of the plaintiff. This, as a general proposition, is 
       certainly not to be denied, especially as it respects 
       adjudication upon the private rights of parties. When 
       they have passed into judgment the right becomes 
       absolute, and it is the duty of the court to enforce it. 
 
        The case before us, however, is distinguishable from 
       this class of cases, so far as it respects that portion of 
       the decree directing the abatement of the bridge. Its 
       interference with the free navigation of the river 
       constituted an obstruction of a public right secured by 
       acts of congress. 
 
Wheeling Bridge, 59 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added). At first 
glance, this reading appears to support the Inmates' 
argument. 
 
However, a more careful analysis shows that the Court's 
holding in Wheeling Bridge did not hinge on the distinction 
between public and private rights. Instead, it focused on 
the difference between prospective injunctive relief and 
judgments for damages. As the Wheeling Bridge Court 
explained, 
 
       if the remedy in this case had been an action at law, 
       and a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff for 
       damages, the right to these would have passed beyond 
       the reach of the power of congress. It would have 
       depended, not upon the public right of the free 
       navigation of the river, but upon the judgment of the 
       court. The decree before us, so far as it respects the 
       costs adjudged, stands upon the same principles, and 
       is unaffected by the subsequent law. But that part of 
       the decree, directing the abatement of the obstruction, 
       is executory, a continuing decree, which requires not 
       only the removal of the bridge, but enjoins the 
       defendants against any reconstruction or continuance. 
 
Wheeling Bridge, 59 U.S. at 431. Thus, the Wheeling Bridge 
Court's decision ultimately turned on the nature of the 
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relief, not the source of the right. As the District Court 
concluded, it is this distinction that "ultimately determines 
the right of Congress to change the law in such a way that 
relief must be altered or modified." Imprisoned Citizens, 11 
F.Supp.2d at 598. Cf. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 232 (noting that 
the statute at issue in Wheeling Bridge "altered the 
prospective effect of injunctions entered by Article III 
courts" and that "nothing in our holding today calls 
[Wheeling Bridge] . . . into question."); Polites v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 426, 438 (1960)(Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(citing Wheeling Bridge for the proposition that "it was the 
law long before the promulgation of Rule 60(b) that a 
change in the law after the rendition of a decree was 
grounds for modification or dissolution of that decree 
insofar as it might affect future conduct."). We therefore 
reject the Inmates' "public rights" argument. Accord, Gavin 
v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1088 (8th Cir. 1997) ("The 
character of the right involved has nothing to do with the 
separation-of-powers issue that we have in this case."). 
 
Our holding today would be no different if we were to 
decide that the Wheeling Bridge exception only applies 
where public rights are at stake. To whatever extent the 
consent decree embodies private rights, those rights are 
unaffected by the PLRA.6 As the Second Circuit recently 
explained, 
 
       [E]ven assuming that we were to adopt the requirement 
       that--under separation of powers principles--executory 
       judgments must concern a public right in order to be 
       susceptible to legislative revision, that would still not 
       render the termination provision unconstitutional . . . . 
       This is because the . . . right in question in this case 
       relates not to the private rights of the detainees .. . but 
       to the right to have non-federal claims vindicated in a 
       federal forum. . . . Thus, even if we accept the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We express no opinion as to whether the Inmates have private rights 
in the consent decree. See infra, Section II.C.2. We simply note that if 
they do, those rights exist under state law and are not affected by the 
PLRA. See 18 U.S.C. S 3626(d) ("The limitations on remedies in this 
section shall not apply to relief entered by a State court based solely 
upon claims arising under State law."). 
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       plaintiffs' graft of a `public right' requirement as 
       limiting the circumstances in which an executory 
       judgment can be legislatively altered, the termination 
       provision survives. 
 
Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 172 (2d Cir. 1997), 
reh'g granted Dec. 23, 1997. Therefore, even if the Inmates' 
"public rights" reading of Wheeling Bridge had some 
validity, it would not affect our decision. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the PLRA does not 
impermissibly mandate the reopening of final judgments. 
 
2. Prescribing a Rule of Decision 
 
Relying on United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 
(1871), the Inmates also contend that the termination 
provision violates the separation-of-powers doctrine by 
prescribing the rule of decision in a pending case. In Klein, 
the Court held unconstitutional a federal statute enacted 
after the Civil War that was designed to prevent pardoned 
ex-Confederates from reclaiming seized property. The act 
proclaimed that a presidential pardon constituted 
conclusive evidence that the pardoned individual had been 
disloyal to the United States. Id. at 143-44. It also provided 
that a pardon could not be used as evidence of loyalty in a 
suit to recover confiscated property from the United States, 
and directed the Court to dismiss all recovery cases 
pending on appeal in which a pardoned individual had 
prevailed. Id. The Court found that in enacting the statute, 
Congress was attempting to prescribe the rule of decision 
for pending cases in violation of the separation-of-powers 
doctrine. Id. at 147. 
 
While the Supreme Court has never determined "the 
precise scope of Klein," Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218, "later 
decisions have made clear that its prohibition does not take 
hold when" Congress merely "amend[s] applicable law." Id. 
(quoting Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 
441 (1992)). Thus, if a statute "compel[s] changes in the 
law, not findings or results under old law," it merely 
amends the underlying law, and is therefore not subject to 
a Klein challenge. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 438. 
 
Relying heavily on the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Taylor, 
the Inmates argue that the PLRA "direct[s] the outcome of 
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this case and similarly situated pre-PLRA consent decrees." 
Taylor, 143 F.3d at 1184. We disagree. 
 
While S 3626(b)(2) requires a district court to terminate 
prospective relief approved in the absence of afinding that 
the relief is no greater than necessary to correct ongoing 
violations of federal rights, it does not "direct the outcome 
of this case and similarly situated pre-PLRA consent 
decrees." Taylor, 143 F.3d at 1184. Section 3626(b)(2) 
provides only the standard the district courts must apply, 
not a rule of decision. It can therefore be said that the 
PLRA "has left the judicial functions of interpreting the law 
and applying the law to the facts entirely in the hands of 
the courts." Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1089 (8th 
Cir. 1997). Accord Hadix, 133 F.3d at 943 ("The 
interpretation and application of law to fact and the 
ultimate resolution of prison condition cases remain at all 
times with the judiciary."); Inmates of Suffolk County, 129 
F.3d at 657-58; ("[T]he relevant underlying law for present 
purposes is not the Eighth Amendment, but the power of 
the federal courts to grant prospective relief absent a 
violation of a federal right. Thus, the PLRA does not run 
afoul of Klein because it does not tamper with courts' 
decisional rules--that is, courts remain free to interpret 
and apply the law to the facts as they discern them."); 
Benjamin, 124 F.3d at 174 ("[U]nlike the Klein statute, the 
termination provision does not prevent courts from 
exercising jurisdiction over those cases that involve 
violations of . . . federal rights."); Plyler, 100 F.3d at 372 
("In short, S 3626(b)(2) provides only the standard to which 
district courts must adhere, not the result they must 
reach."). 
 
We conclude that because S 3626(b)(2) "compel[s] 
changes in the law, not findings or results under old law," 
it is not subject to a Klein challenge. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 
438. 
 
3. Authority to Enforce Effective Remedies 
 
The Inmates also argue that the termination provision 
strips the courts of their inherent power to enforce effective 
remedies in constitutional cases. We reject this argument. 
Under the PLRA, courts retain their authority to adjudicate 
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constitutional challenges and grant equitable relief to 
remedy constitutional violations. The PLRA simply requires 
that such relief be "narrowly drawn," extend "no further 
than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right," 
and be "the least intrusive means necessary to correct the 
violation of the Federal right." 18 U.S.C. SS 3626(a)(1)(A), 
(b)(2), and (b)(3). 
 
These standards are consistent with well-established 
limitations on the courts' authority to issue prospective 
injunctive relief to remedy constitutional violations. In 
constitutional cases, "the nature of the violation determines 
the scope of the remedy." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
B'd of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). Likewise, the remedy 
imposed must be tailored--temporally as well as 
substantively--to redress the constitutional wrong at issue. 
See e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) ("The 
remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that 
produced the injury-in-fact that the plaintiff has 
established."); Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public 
Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) ("[N]ecessary 
concern for the important values of local control . . . 
dictates that a federal court's regulatory control .. . not 
extend beyond the time required to remedy the effects of 
past [constitutional violations]."). In this sense, the PLRA 
amounts to little more than a codification of already- 
existing rules governing judicial interference with prisons. 
 
We disagree with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the 
PLRA "leaves no room for judicial decision-making." Taylor, 
143 F.3d at 1184. The statute expressly authorizes the 
courts to "continue to define the scope of prisoners' 
constitutional rights, review the factual record, apply the 
judicially determined constitutional standards to the facts 
as they are found in the record and determine what relief 
is necessary to remedy the constitutional violations." Tyler 
v. Murphy, 135 F.3d 594, 597 (8th Cir. 1998). As a result, 
the courts will still be capable of "remedy[ing] violations of 
prisoners' constitutional rights as they have traditionally 
done in litigated cases." Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 
162, 170 (2d Cir. 1997) reh'g granted (Dec. 23, 1997). 
Accordingly, we conclude that the PLRA's effect on the 
courts' authority to remedy constitutional violations does 
not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. 
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B. Equal Protection 
 
The Inmates also argue that S 3626(b)(2) deprives them of 
their right to equal protection of the laws. They contend 
that, as a whole, the PLRA burdens their fundamental right 
of access to the courts, and therefore must be analyzed 
under strict scrutiny. 
 
1. Strict Scrutiny 
 
The termination provision does not deny prisoners"a 
reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed 
violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the 
courts." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (quoting 
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977)). Rather, it 
merely restricts the relief that prisoners may obtain from 
the courts. See Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 373 (4th Cir. 
1996). The provision therefore does not infringe any 
identified fundamental right, and is subject to only rational 
basis review. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 
(1996). 
 
2. Rational Basis Scrutiny 
 
The Inmates argue that even if S 3626(b)(2) is not subject 
to strict scrutiny, it still fails under rational basis review. 
Specifically, they claim that the provision discriminates 
against prisoners, and is not rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental interest. We are not persuaded. 
 
While S 3626(b)(2) admittedly singles out certain prisoner 
rights cases for special treatment, it does so only to 
advance unquestionably legitimate purposes--to minimize 
prison micro-management by federal courts and to conserve 
judicial resources. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349 ("[I]t is not 
the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to 
shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to 
comply with the laws and the Constitution."); see also City 
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 
(1985) (explaining that a statute subject to rational basis 
review will survive an equal protection challenge "if the 
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest."). The termination provision 
therefore satisfies the demands of equal protection. 
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C. The District Court's Denial of the Inmates' Motion 
       to Stay 
 
The Inmates also argue that the District Court abused its 
discretion by refusing to stay the termination order until 
such time as "the courts of Pennsylvania agree to enforce 
the [consent decree]." Brief for Appellants at 46. In making 
this argument, the Inmates rely heavily on the Second 
Circuit's novel theory that (a) consent decrees embody 
"contracts arising under state law" and (b) federal courts 
therefore cannot terminate a consent decree under 
S 3626(b)(2) without first securing parties' contractual 
rights under that decree. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 
F.3d 162, 178-79 (2d Cir. 1997), reh'g granted (Dec. 23, 
1997). 
 
1. Clear Statutory Mandate 
 
We cannot accept this argument without ignoring the 
plain language of the PLRA. The statute entitles defendants 
to "immediate termination of any prospective relief" absent 
a finding of a current and ongoing violation of federal law. 
See 18 U.S.C. S 3626(b)(2), (b)(3). It also broadly defines 
"prospective relief " as including "all relief other than 
compensatory monetary damages," 18 U.S.C. S 3626(g)(7).7 
Because the 1978 consent decree unquestionably fits 
within that definition, and because the district court made 
no findings of a current and ongoing violation of federal 
law, the law demands nothing less than the immediate 
termination of the consent decree. The Inmates cite no 
principle of law that allows us to disregard this 
unambiguous statutory mandate in order to preserve the 
consent decree. In effect, the Inmates have asked us to turn 
the termination provision on its head, and replace S 3626(b) 
with language prohibiting termination of consent decrees 
unless or until a state court "agrees to enforce" them. We 
decline their invitation to do so. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The PLRA defines "relief " as "all relief in any form that may be 
granted 
or approved by the court, and includes consent decrees, but does not 
include private settlement agreements." 18 U.S.C.S 3626(g)(9). It further 
defines "consent decree" as "any relief entered by the court that is based 
in whole or in part upon the consent or acquiescence of the parties, but 
does not include private settlements." 18 U.S.C.S 3626(g)(1). 
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2. No Current Unconstitutional Impairment 
 
We also reject the Inmates' claim that since they "might" 
have contractual rights in the consent decrees under 
Pennsylvania law, and Defendants "might" refuse to enforce 
such rights, the District Court must maintain jurisdiction 
over the decrees in order to prevent Defendants from 
unconstitutionally impairing their own contractual 
obligations. Brief for Appellants at 45 (quoting Benjamin, 
124 F.3d at 179). Mere speculation that Defendants might 
refuse to honor alleged contractual obligations is 
insufficient to support a finding of "current and ongoing 
violations of [a] Federal right." 18 U.S.C. S 3626(b)(3). The 
District Court therefore had no statutory basis for 
maintaining jurisdiction over the consent decrees. 
 
If the Inmates have valid contractual claims that survive 
termination, such claims are "based solely upon .. . 
[Pennsylvania] law," and are not affected by the PLRA. 18 
U.S.C. S 3626(d) ("The limitations on remedies in this 
section shall not apply to relief entered by a State court 
based solely upon claims arising under State law."). The 
Inmates are therefore free to pursue relief in the 
Pennsylvania courts. It is not our province to speak to the 
validity of any "claims arising under [Pennsylvania] law," or 
to award relief therefor. 18 U.S.C. S 3626(d). It is our 
province, however, to decide whether there is any basis for 
the Inmates' argument that the District Court should have 
stayed its termination order until such time as"the courts 
of Pennsylvania agree to enforce the [consent decree]." Brief 
for Appellants at 46. There is not. Accordingly, we conclude 
that the district court's denial of the Inmates motion to stay 
did not amount to an abuse of discretion. 
 
D. Defendants' Past Non-Compliance 
 
Finally, the Inmates argue that the District Court abused 
its discretion by refusing to hold Defendants in contempt 
for failing to comply with portions of the consent decree in 
the past. More to the point, they claim that the District 
Court should have denied Defendants' motion to terminate 
as a remedy for contempt. 
 
Again, we cannot accept this argument without ignoring 
the express language of the PLRA. Congress could have 
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authorized the courts to maintain jurisdiction over a 
consent decree where the defendants have failed to comply 
with the decree. However, it did not. Instead, Congress 
chose to allow the courts to maintain jurisdiction only 
where defendants are guilty of "current and ongoing" 
violations of a federal right. 18 U.S.C. S 3626(b)(3). 
 
Moreover, denying Defendants' motion to terminate would 
have been an inappropriate remedy for civil contempt 
because it would have "had no coercive effect." Harris v. 
City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, 1328 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(holding that denying a motion to terminate under the 
PLRA was not a proper remedy for civil contempt related to 
the city's past non-compliance with a consent decree). We 
therefore conclude that the District Court's refusal to cite 
Defendants with contempt did not amount to an abuse of 
discretion. 
 
III. 
 
The Inmates have not established that the PLRA is 
unconstitutional, nor have they established that the 
District Court abused its discretion in any way. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
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